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Here	  we	  propose	  a	  Bayesian	  approach	  to	  person	  perception,	  outlining	  the	  theoretical	  position	  and	  a	  
methodological	   framework	   for	   testing	   the	   predictions	   experimentally.	   We	   use	   the	   term	   person	  
perception	  to	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  others’	  personal	  attributes	  such	  as	  age	  and	  sex	  but	  
also	   to	   the	   perception	   of	   social	   signals	   such	   as	   direction	   of	   gaze	   and	   emotional	   expression.	   The	  
Bayesian	   approach	   provides	   a	   formal	   description	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   our	   perception	   combines	  
current	   sensory	   evidence	   with	   prior	   expectations	   about	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   environment.	   Such	  
expectations	   can	   lead	   to	   unconscious	   biases	   in	   our	   perception	   that	   are	   particularly	   evident	  when	  
sensory	  evidence	  is	  uncertain.	  	  We	  illustrate	  the	  ideas	  with	  reference	  to	  our	  recent	  studies	  on	  gaze	  
perception	  which	  show	  that	  people	  have	  a	  bias	  to	  perceive	  the	  gaze	  of	  others	  as	  directed	  towards	  
themselves.	  We	  also	  describe	  a	  potential	  application	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  person’s	  sex,	  
in	  which	  a	  bias	  towards	  perceiving	  males	  is	  typically	  observed.	  	  
	  
Introduction	  
When	  we	  look	  at	  another	  person	  what	  do	  we	  expect	  to	  see?	  And	  what	  role	  do	  those	  expectations	  
play	  in	  the	  processing	  of	  our	  sensory	  input	  and	  in	  determining	  what	  we	  perceive?	  When	  we	  look	  at	  a	  
body	  or	  a	  face	  we	  have	  a	  clear	  expectation	  of	  its	  basic	  structure	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constituent	  elements	  
and	   their	   configuration	   (Figure	   1).	   There	   are	   also	   well-­‐documented	   asymmetries	   or	   biases	   in	   the	  
perception	  of	  attributes	  such	  as	  sex	  and	  age	   indicating	  a	  role	   for	  prior	  expectation	  at	  a	  perceptual	  
and/or	   cognitive	   level.	   For	   example,	   when	   presented	   with	   an	   image	   of	   a	   face,	   there	   is	   a	   bias	   to	  
respond	   ‘male’	  when	   asked	   about	   that	   person’s	   sex	   (e.g.	   Armann	  &	   Bulthoff,	   2012)	   and	   to	   judge	  
their	  age	  as	  closer	  to	  your	  own	  (e.g.	  Voelkle	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  However,	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  adequate	  
theoretical	   framework	   within	   which	   to	   interpret	   these	   effects	   or	   to	   generate	   new	   testable	  
predictions.	   	  This	   leaves	   the	   field	  with	  no	  clear	   idea	  about	  how	  perceptual	  and	  decision	  processes	  
are	  dissociated	  and	  therefore	  at	  what	   level	  prior	  expectations	  are	  operating	  and	  biases	  generated.	  
Specifically,	  are	  these	  perceptual	  biases	  in	  the	  processing	  of	  sensory	  information	  that	  actually	  affect	  
the	  way	   things	   look	   to	   the	   observer	   or	   are	   they	   cognitive	   response	   biases	   in	   the	   decision	   criteria	  
used	  to	  categorize	  that	  sensory	  information?	  This	  is	  an	  important	  question	  because	  such	  biases	  may	  
have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  how	  we	  interact	  with	  people	  in	  a	  range	  of	  consequential	  settings.	  	  
To	   establish	   the	   level	   at	   which	   prior	   expectations	   are	   implemented	   in	   the	   system,	   we	   propose	   a	  
Bayesian	   framework	   for	   the	   study	   of	   person	   perception.	   We	   do	   not	   intend	   the	   term	   “person	  
perception”	   to	   be	   taken	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   perception	   of	   identity,	   although	   we	   speculate	   that	   the	  
Bayesian	  framework	  may	  also	  be	  of	  relevance	  to	  identity	  recognition	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   information	  
about	  the	  context	  in	  which	  a	  person	  is	  encountered	  provides	  prior	  expectation	  as	  to	  who	  they	  are.	  
The	  Bayesian	  framework	  provides	  a	  principled	  approach	  to	  understanding	  person	  perception	  using	  a	  
method	  that	  has	  proven	  successful	  in	  designing	  and	  interpreting	  psychophysical	  experiments	  in	  the	  





	   	  
	  
A	  Bayesian	  estimator	  combines	  sensory	  evidence	  with	  stored	  knowledge,	   represented	  as	   the	  prior	  
probability	  distribution.	  The	  prior	  probability	  distribution	  can	  embody	  not	  only	  expectations	  about	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  environment	  (e.g.	  Stocker	  &	  Simoncelli,	  2006a;	  Girshick	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  but	  also	  the	  
likely	  consequences	  of	  errors	  for	  the	  observer	  (Haselton	  &	  Buss,	  2000;	  Haselton	  &	  Nettle,	  2006).	  For	  
example,	  we	  expect	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  face	  to	  be	  two	  eyes	  above	  a	  noise	  and	  a	  mouth	  (and	  can	  feel	  
quite	   disconcerted	   when	   that	   expectation	   is	   violated,	   as	   in	   Figure	   1).	   In	   terms	   of	   errors,	   the	  
consequence	   of	   misidentifying	   a	   man	   as	   a	   woman	   might	   be	   more	   costly	   than	   misidentifying	   a	  
woman	  as	  a	  man	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  missing	  an	  instance	  of	  gaze	  directed	  at	  you	  might	  be	  greater	  than	  
the	  cost	  of	  a	  false	  alarm	  when	  gaze	  is	  in	  fact	  directed	  elsewhere.	  
The	   Bayesian	   approach	   has	   proved	   influential	   in	   understanding	   the	   role	   of	   prior	   expectation	   in	  
vision.	   For	   example,	   experimental	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   humans	   have	   a	   prior	   expectation	   for	  
motion	  to	  be	  slow	  (Stocker	  &	  Simoncelli,	  2006a),	  contours	  to	  be	  horizontal	  or	  vertical	  (Girshick	  et	  al.,	  
2011)	   and	   lighting	   to	   come	   from	  above	   and	   slightly	   to	   the	   left	   (Gerardin	  et	   al.,	   2010).	  A	  Bayesian	  
framework	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  cognition	  and	  its	  disorders	  in	  conditions	  
such	  as	  autism	  and	  schizophrenia	  (Kilner	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Fletcher	  &	  Frith,	  2009;	  Hohwy	  &	  Palmer,	  2014).	  
In	  a	  recent	  paper,	  we	  applied	  the	  Bayesian	  approach	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  the	  processing	  of	  a	  socially	  
relevant	  perceptual	   feature,	  namely	   the	  direction	  of	  another’s	  gaze	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013b).	  This	  
has	  provided	  an	   important	   insight	   into	  gaze	  perception,	  namely	   that	  humans	  have	  an	  expectation	  
that	  gaze	   is	  directed	  towards	   them	  that	  acts	   to	  “pull”	   the	  perceived	  direction	  of	  gaze	   towards	   the	  
observer,	  particularly	  under	  conditions	  of	  high	  stimulus	  uncertainty	  (see	  also	  Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  
Martin	  &	  Jones,	  1982;	  Martin	  &	  Rovira,	  1981;	  Sheldrake,	  2003).	  We	  believe	  that	  this	  approach	  will	  
prove	   readily	   extendable	   to	   the	   investigation	   of	   how	   our	   visual	   systems	   deal	   with	   the	   task	   of	  
extracting	  socially	  relevant	  information	  from	  often	  uncertain,	  incomplete	  or	  ambiguous	  visual	  input	  




Bias	  in	  the	  Perception	  of	  a	  Person’s	  Sex	  
As	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  potential	  applicability	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  approach,	  consider	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  
person’s	  sex.	  There	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  bias	  to	  respond	  ‘male’	  when	  asked	  to	  report	  a	  person’s	  sex	  
from	  an	  image	  of	  their	  face	  (e.g.	  Cellerino	  et	  al,	  2004;	  Armann	  &	  Bulthoff,	  2012)	  that	  has	  also	  been	  
reported	   in	  chimpanzees	  (de	  Waal	  &	  Pokorny,	  2008).	  A	  similar	   ‘male	  bias’	  has	  also	  been	  found	  for	  
body	   shape	   (Johnson	  et	   al,	   2012),	   hands	   (Gaetano	   et	   al,	   2014)	   and	   biological	  motion	   (Troje	  et	   al,	  
2006).	   It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that,	   in	   the	   history	   of	   humans,	   misclassifying	   a	   man	   as	   female	   has	  
generally	  proved	  to	  be	  potentially	  more	  dangerous	  than	  misclassifying	  a	  woman	  as	  male	  (Armann	  &	  
Bulthoff,	  2012).	  A	  similar	  “better	  safe	  than	  sorry”	  heuristic	  has	  also	  been	  invoked	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  bias	  for	  direct	  gaze	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013b)	  and	  other	  social	   judgments	  (Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  
Haselton	  &	  Nettle,	  2006).	  Whenever	  judgments	  are	  made	  under	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  errors	  
are	   asymmetrical	   in	   this	   way,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   human	   decision	   making	   should	   be	   biased	  
toward	  making	  less	  costly	  errors.	  This	  bias	  might	  increase	  overall	  error	  rates,	  but	  it	  minimizes	  overall	  
cost	  (Haselton	  &	  Buss,	  2000;	  Haselton	  &	  Nettle,	  2006).	  
A	   distinction	   has	   been	   made	   in	   the	   sex	   perception	   literature	   between	   perceptual	   biases	   in	   the	  
processing	  of	   sensory	   information	  and	  cognitive	   response	  biases	   in	   the	   criteria	  used	   to	   categorize	  
that	   information	   (e.g.	  Webster	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Armann	  &	  Bulthoff,	  2012).	   	  A	  heuristic	  bias	  underlying	  
our	  judgments	  about	  another	  person’s	  sex	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  implemented	  at	  either	  (or	  both)	  of	  
these	  levels.	  Through	  a	  Bayesian-­‐inspired	  experimental	  approach,	  perceptual	  biases	  can	  be	  isolated	  
experimentally	  by	  avoiding	  the	  use	  of	  a	  categorization	  judgment.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  requiring	  
subjects	   to	  make	  a	   forced-­‐choice	  discrimination	  as	   to	  which	  of	   two	  stimuli	  appears	  more	  male	   (or	  
more	  female)	  instead	  of	  reporting	  whether	  a	  particular	  stimulus	  appears	  male	  or	  female.	  Making	  a	  
relative	   judgment	   between	   two	   stimuli	   allows	   us	   to	   avoid	   the	   issue	   of	   categorization	   and	   better	  
isolate	   biases	   at	   the	   perceptual	   level.	   We	   can	   then	   model	   perception	   as	   a	   process	   of	   Bayesian	  
estimation	  according	  to	  which	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  combined	  with	  stored	  knowledge,	  represented	  as	  
the	  prior	  probability	  distribution.	  	  
	  
The	  Bayesian	  Framework:	  Sensory	  Representations,	  Likelihood	  Functions,	  Priors	  &	  Posteriors	  
On	  any	  given	  presentation	  of	  a	  stimulus	  attribute	  of	  value	  θ0,	  the	  observer’s	  sensory	  representation	  
of	  the	  stimulus	  provides	  a	  noisy	  estimate,	  θN,	  of	  the	  value	  of	  that	  attribute.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  analytic	  
tractability	  we	  assume	  that,	  across	  trials,	  the	  noise	  in	  the	  sensory	  estimate	  can	  be	  approximated	  by	  a	  
Gaussian	  distribution	  of	  mean	  zero	  and	  standard	  deviation	  σ0.	  Hence,	  on	  any	  given	  presentation	  of	  a	  
stimulus	  attribute	  of	  value	  θ0,	  the	  sensory	  estimate	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  Gaussian	  probability	  distribution	  
with	  mean	  θ0	  and	  standard	  deviation	  σ0.	  Under	  a	  Bayesian	  framework,	  this	  purely	  sensory	  estimate	  
is	   combined	   with	   prior	   knowledge	   about	   the	   probable	   value	   of	   the	   attribute	   to	   produce	   a	   more	  
robust	  estimate: ( ) ( ) ( )θθθθθ pLp NN || ∝ .	  In	  the	  context	  of,	  say,	  gaze	  perception,	  this	  means	  that	  
the	   posterior	   probability	   distribution,	   p(θ	   |	   θN),	   of	   the	   direction	   of	   gaze	   given	   the	   sensory	  
representation	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  that	  representation	  given	  the	  stimulus,	  L(θN	  |	  θ)	  
multiplied	   by	   the	   prior	   probability	   of	   the	   direction	   of	   gaze,	   p(θ).	   If	   the	   noise,	   σ0,	   in	   the	   sensory	  
estimate	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  precise	  direction	  of	  gaze	  within	  the	  vicinity	  of	  θ0,	  then	  the	  likelihood	  
function	  will	   also	   be	  Gaussian	  with	   standard	  deviation	  σ0	   (Figure	   2,	   Left).	   Assuming	   that	   the	  prior	  
probability	  distribution	  can	  also	  be	  described	  by	  a	  Gaussian,	  the	  posterior	  distribution	  for	  any	  given	  
5	  
	  
observation	  of	  gaze	  direction	  is	  itself	  Gaussian	  (Figure	  2,	  Right),	  which	  greatly	  simplifies	  derivation	  of	  
further	  analytic	  results.	  
	  
	  
A	  Psychophysical	  Task	  to	  Estimate	  the	  Prior	  Illustrated	  with	  Gaze	  Perception	  
In	   recent	  studies	  we	  have	   taken	  a	  Bayesian	  experimental	  approach	   to	   investigate	   the	   role	  of	  prior	  
expectation	   in	   the	  perception	  of	  others’	  direction	  of	  gaze,	   specifically	  whether	  someone	   is	   looking	  
directly	  at	  us	  or	  to	  our	  left	  or	  right	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013b,	  2014).	  Gaze	  processing	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	  serve	  as	  a	  useful	  model	  system	  for	  social	  neuroscience	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  relative	  simplicity	  and	  the	  
identification	  of	  neural	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  primate	  brains	  (e.g.	  Perrett	  et	  al.,	  
1985;	   Calder	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   Key	   to	   our	   experimental	   approach	   is	   the	   manipulation	   of	   stimulus	  
uncertainty	   to	   recover	   the	   prior	   probability	   distribution	   that	   represents	   our	   stored	   knowledge.	  
Within	  a	  Bayesian	  framework,	  increasing	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  a	  stimulus	  increases	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
prior,	   effectively	   “pulling”	   the	   resulting	   percept	   (taken	   to	   be	   the	   maximum	   a	   posteriori	   or	   MAP	  
estimate	  of	  the	  attibute	  value)	  towards	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  prior	  distribution	  (Figure	  2).	  	  
To	  quantify	  the	  effect	  of	  stimulus	  uncertainty	  on	  perception,	  we	  measure	  bias	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  
specific	   stimulus	  attributes	   (e.g.	  horizontal	  gaze	  deviation)	   in	  a	   forced-­‐choice	   task	  between	  stimuli	  
differing	  in	  their	  uncertainty	  (e.g.	  Stocker	  &	  Simoncelli,	  2006a;	  Girshick	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  
2013b).	   Specifically,	   in	   our	   psychophysical	   task	   we	   present	   two	   stimuli	   at	   different	   levels	   of	  
uncertainty,	   σ1	   and	   σ2,	   associated	   with	   their	   respective	   sensory	   estimates.	   Subjects	   are	   asked	   to	  
report	  which	   stimulus	   appears	   to	   have	   the	   attribute	  with	   the	   greater	   (or	   lesser)	   value	   (e.g.	  which	  
face	  is	  gazing	  more	  to	  the	  left).	  To	  manipulate	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  sensory	  representation	  













time	  decreasing	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  pupil	  and	  the	  sclera	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013ab,	  2014),	  as	  
illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3A.	  
	  
	  
On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   Bayesian	   framework	   outlined	   above,	   we	   can	   make	   the	   following	   qualitative	  
predictions	  about	  the	  form	  of	  the	  experimental	  data:	  (1)	  the	  pull	  of	  the	  prior	  will	  be	  zero	  when	  the	  
stimulus	  lies	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  prior;	  (2)	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  pull	  will	  depend	  upon	  which	  side	  of	  the	  
peak	  of	  the	  prior	  the	  stimulus	  lies;	  (3)	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  pull	  will	  increase	  with	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  
the	  sensory	  representation	  of	   the	  stimulus;	   (4)	   for	  a	  Gaussian	  prior,	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  pull	  will	  
increase	  linearly	  with	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  stimulus	  and	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  prior	  (Mareschal	  et	  
al.,	  2013b).	  Together,	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  model	  predict	  the	  characteristic	  cross-­‐shape	  of	  
the	  data	  in	  Figure	  3B	  where	  the	  x-­‐position	  of	  the	  cross	  approximates	  the	  value	  of	  prior.	  The	  slope	  of	  
the	   lines	   in	   Figure	   3B	   depends	   on	   the	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   sensory	   representations	   of	   the	   stimuli,	  
which	   can	   be	   estimated	   from	   discrimination	   data	   (as	   in	   Mareschal	   et	   al,	   2013b)	   to	   produce	   a	  
quantitative	  description	  of	  the	  prior.	  
To	   ensure	   that	   our	   findings	   generalize	   beyond	   the	  particular	   forced-­‐choice	   task	   employed,	   and	   to	  
directions	   of	   gaze	   deviation	   beyond	   horizontal,	   we	   developed	   an	   alternative	   task	   in	   which	  
participants	   indicated	   the	  direction	  of	   gaze	  of	   a	   single	   stimulus	  by	  means	  of	   an	  on-­‐screen	  pointer	  
which	  they	  controlled	  via	  a	  computer	  mouse	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Figure	  3C	  shows	  mean	  results	  
from	   a	   cohort	   of	   8	   participants.	   Lines	   join	   data	   points	   from	   corresponding	   stimuli	   presented	   in	  
noiseless	  (solid	  symbol)	  and	  noisy	  conditions.	  The	  resulting	  needles	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  point	  towards	  a	  
direction	   close	   to	   direct	   gaze,	   consistent	   with	   the	   prior	   for	   direct	   gaze	   inferred	   from	   the	   data	  
collected	   by	   Mareschal	   et	   al.	   (2013b)	   using	   the	   forced-­‐choice	   task.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   not	   only	   for	  
horizontal	  gaze	  deviations	  but	  for	  all	  gaze	  directions	  tested.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  perceptual	  
bias	  is	  towards	  direct	  gaze	  per	  se	  rather	  than	  towards	  the	  orientation	  of	  the	  head,	  as	  also	  observed	  
by	  Mareschal	  et	  al.	  (2013b)	  using	  the	  forced-­‐choice	  task,	  as	  head	  orientation	  is	  15	  degrees	  leftwards	  












































































Evidence	  of	  a	  prior	  expectation	  for	  others’	  gaze	  to	  be	  directed	  towards	  us	  thus	  appears	  to	  generalize	  
across	  head	  orientation,	  direction	  of	  gaze	  deviation,	  and	  behavioural	  task	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.	  (2013b,	  
2014).	   Future	   work	   might	   profitably	   employ	   an	   alternative	   operationalization	   of	   stimulus	  
uncertainty,	  such	  as	  manipulation	  of	  stimulus	  duration,	  to	  confirm	  that	  this	  pattern	  of	  results	  does	  
not	  depend	  upon	  the	  addition	  of	  noise	  to	  and	  reduction	  of	  contrast	  within	  the	  eyes.	  	  	  	  
	  
Structure	  of	  the	  Representational	  Space	  for	  Person	  Perception:	  Priors	  and	  Norms	  	  
In	   the	   sensory	   coding	   literature	   it	   is	   common	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   representation	   of	   low-­‐level	  
perceptual	   attributes	   (e.g.	   speed	   of	   image	   motion)	   in	   terms	   of	   channels	   selective	   for	   a	   range	   of	  
values	   of	   that	   attribute	   (e.g.	   fast	   and	   slow	   speed	   channels:	   Edwards	   et	   al.,	   1998).	   Previous	   work	  
applying	  psychophysical	  adaptation	  to	  high-­‐level	  vision	  has	  been	  used	  to	  make	  inferences	  about	  the	  
way	   representations	   of	   the	   various	   attributes	   of	   faces	   are	   structured.	   The	   dimensions	   of	   this	  
representational	   ‘face	  space’	   include	  sex,	   identity,	  attractiveness,	  age,	  race	  and	  emotion	  as	  well	  as	  
direction	  of	  gaze	  (e.g.	  Calder	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Leopold	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  O’Neil	  &	  Webster,	  2011;	  Rhodes	  et	  al.,	  
2003,	  2004;	  Watson	  &	  Clifford,	  2003,	  2006;	  Webster	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  Bayesian	  approach	  is	  a	  natural	  
complement	  to	  this	  work	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  direct	  way	  to	  recover	  the	  representational	  structure	  of	  this	  
perceptual	  space.	  Our	  recent	  work	  on	  gaze	  perception	  (Mareschal	  et	  al,	  2013b,	  2014)	  provides	  the	  
methodological	   and	   empirical	   foundations	   for	   the	   translation	   of	   the	   Bayesian	   approach	   from	   its	  
successful	   application	   in	   low-­‐level	   sensory	   and	   motor	   domains	   into	   high-­‐level	   vision	   and	   person	  
perception.	  	  
While	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   Bayesian	   approach	   is	   to	   elucidate	   the	   structure	   of	   long	   standing	   perceptual	  
expectations	  about	  physical	  stimuli,	  psychophysical	  adaptation	  studies	  have	  been	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  
underlying	   channel	   structure	   of	   face	   space	   (for	   a	   review	   see	   Webster	   and	   MacLeod,	   2011).	  	  
Adaptation	   studies	   suggest	   the	   perceptual	   face	   space	   assessed	   in	   these	   studies	   is	   centred	   on	   a	  
neutral	  central	  point,	  or	  a	  norm.	  This	  is	  because	  adaptation	  to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  dimension	  in	  face	  space	  
causes	   a	   negative	   aftereffect	   such	   that	   previously	   neutral	   faces	   take	   on	   the	   appearance	   of	   faces	  
towards	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  continuum	  to	  the	  adaptor.	  For	  example,	  following	  adaptation	  to	  a	  
series	   of	   male	   faces,	   a	   previously	   androgynous	   face	   will	   tend	   to	   appear	   female	   (Webster	   et	   al.,	  
2004).	   The	   norm	   in	   this	   context	   can	   be	   seen	   either	   as	   the	   central	   tendency	   of	   the	   space	   as	  
represented	  by	  a	  channel	  selective	  to	  that	  region	  or	  as	  a	  balance	  point	  between	  channels	  sensitive	  
to	  opposing	  regions	  of	  the	  space	  (Webster	  and	  MacLeod,	  2011;	  Rhodes	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
The	  question,	   then,	   is	  how	  do	  the	  channel	  structure	  suggested	  by	   face	  adaptation	  studies	  and	  the	  
prior	   suggested	   by	   the	   Bayesian	   approaches	   interact.	   The	   standard	   Bayesian	   population	   coding	  
framework	  assumes	  that	  a	  perceptual	  variable	   is	  encoded	  in	  a	  set	  of	  noisy	  channel	  activations	  and	  
that	  prior	  expectation	  is	  incorporated	  into	  a	  subsequent	  decoding	  stage	  that	  operates	  on	  the	  output	  
of	  those	  channels	  (Zemel,	  Dayan	  &	  Pouget,	  1998).	  	  An	  intuitive	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  adaptation	  might	  
change	   the	   prior	   distribution.	   Specifically,	   if	   the	   prior	   reflects	   the	   distribution	   of	   values	   of	   the	  
perceptual	  variable	  in	  the	  world	  then	  repeated	  presentation	  of	  the	  same	  value	  should	  increase	  the	  
prior	   probability	   in	   its	   vicinity.	   However,	   such	   a	   change	   in	   the	   prior	   distribution	   would	   lead	   to	   a	  
perceptual	  bias	  that	  is	  opposite	  to	  the	  negative	  aftereffects	  typically	  observed	  perceptually	  (Stocker	  




Alternatively,	   it	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   prior	   expectation	  might	   be	   encoded	   implicitly	  within	   the	  
channel	   structure	   itself	   rather	   than	   through	   an	   explicit	   decoding	   stage	   (Fischer	   &	   Pena,	   2011;	  
Ganguli	  &	  Simoncelli,	  2014).	  Take,	   for	  example,	   the	  perception	  of	  gaze	  direction,	  where	   there	   is	  a	  
prior	  towards	  perceiving	  direct	  gaze	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013b,	  2014).	  Adaptation	  studies	  indicate	  that	  
gaze	  direction	  is	  coded	  by	  a	  multi-­‐channel	  system	  involving	  channels	  representing	  various	  directions	  
of	   gaze	   deviation	   (Jenkins	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Cheleski	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   channel	   explicitly	  
representing	   direct	   gaze	   (Calder,	   Jenkins,	   Cassel	   and	   Clifford,	   2008).	   A	   degree	   of	   baseline	   activity	  
equal	  across	  these	  channels	  would	  tend	  to	  pull	  the	  representation	  of	  gaze	  direction	  in	  noisy	  stimuli	  
towards	   their	   central	   tendency,	   namely	   direct	   gaze.	   If	   the	   level	   of	   this	   baseline	   activity	  was	   small	  
compared	   to	   the	  channel	  activation	  generated	  by	  a	   stimulus	  of	  high	  certainty	   then	   the	  pull	  of	   the	  
prior	   would	   diminish	   as	   stimulus	   certainty	   increased.	   Thus,	   in	   this	   instance	   of	   a	   multi-­‐channel	  
representation	   including	   an	   explicit	   channel	   for	   direct	   gaze,	   it	   appears	   that	   both	   the	   effects	   of	  
perceptual	   adaptation	   and	   the	   prior	   could	   be	   instantiated	   through	   encoding	   within	   the	   same	  
channel	  structure	  without	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate	  prior	  knowledge	  explicitly	  at	  the	  decoding	  stage	  
(Figure	  4).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  effects	  of	  adaptation	  might	  be	  better	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  short-­‐term	  
changes	  in	  channel	  sensitivity	  in	  response	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  signal-­‐to-­‐noise	  ratio	  of	  the	  sensory	  signal	  
in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  adaptor	  value	  (Wainwright,	  1999),	  while	  the	  prior	  remains	  stable	  to	  reflect	  long-­‐
term	  environmental	  regularities.	  
This	  neat	  scenario,	  where	  both	  prior	  and	  channel	  structure	  are	  combined	  into	  a	  single	  model,	  need	  
not	   apply	   to	   all	   decision	   categories.	   While	   adaptation	   is	   generally	   considered	   to	   uncover	   the	  
structure	   of	   the	   encoded	   representation	   of	   the	   stimulus	   dimensions	   under	   investigation,	   the	  
Bayesian	   approach	   could	   be	  measuring	   either	   an	   expectation	   that	   is	   encoded	  within	   the	   channel	  
structure	  (Fischer	  &	  Pena,	  2011;	  Ganguli and Simoncelli, 2014) or	  one	  that	  becomes	  apparent	  not	  at	  
the	  encoding	  but	  at	  a	  decoding	  stage	  (Zemel,	  Dayan	  &	  Pouget,	  1998).	  	  A	  full	  investigation	  of	  the	  form	  
of	   any	   biases	   measured	   should	   uncover	   more	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   underlying	  
representation	  proposed	  via	  adaptation	  and	  that	  proposed	  by	  a	  Bayesian	  approach.	  	  
The	  use	  of	  a	  Gaussian	  probability	  distribution	  to	  model	  perceptual	  prior	  expectation	  is	  motivated	  in	  






















not	  be	  Gaussian.	   For	  example,	   in	  domains	  of	   face	  perception	  where	   there	  are	  discrete	  categories,	  
such	   as	   sex	   and	   race,	   priors	   might	   not	   be	   unimodal	   but	   instead	   contain	   multiple	   peaks	   each	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  norm	  of	  a	  different	  category.	  Conceptualization	  of	  a	  perceptual	  norm	  as	  a	  peak	  
within	  a	  prior	  distribution	  thus	  provides	  a	  natural	  way	   in	  which	  different	  dimensions	  of	   face	  space	  
might	  be	  found	  experimentally	  to	  have	  one	  or	  many	  norms.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  anticipate	  that	  mixture	  
of	   Gaussian	   prior	   probability	   distributions	   (Knill,	   2003)	   might	   provide	   a	   rich	   description	   of	   the	  
expectations	  underlying	  our	  perception	  of	  faces.	  
	  
The	  Bayesian	  Approach	  as	  Unconscious	  Perceptual	  Inference	  
The	  Bayesian	  approach	  as	  we	  put	   it	   forward	   imposes	  prior	  expectations	  on	   the	   sensory	   input	  and	  
this	  could	  be	  achieved	  at	  perceptual	  levels	  of	  processing	  without	  requiring	  any	  cognitive	  inference.	  
Even	  if	  the	  prior	  is	  considered	  to	  operate	  at	  the	  decoding	  stage	  of	  stimulus	  processing,	  rather	  than	  
being	   implicit	   in	   the	   channel	   structure,	   this	   need	   not	   require	   any	   cognitive	   input.	   To	   uncover	   the	  
prior	   for	   gaze	   direction,	   the	   studies	   outlined	   above	   (Mareschal	   et	   al.,	   2013b,	   2014)	   used	   tasks	  
designed	  to	  avoid	  the	  need	  for	  a	  categorical	   judgment.	  This	  minimized	  the	  possible	  contribution	  of	  
cognitive	   biases,	   providing	   a	   result	   that	   can	   be	   incorporated	   into	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   gaze	  
direction	   is	   coded	   at	   a	   perceptual	   level.	   Indeed,	   one	   strength	   of	   the	   Bayesian	   approach	   is	   the	  
potential	   to	   extend	   the	   experimental	   paradigm	   to	   manipulate	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   participant	  
introducing	  a	  cognitive	  bias	   into	   their	  decision	  making	  strategy.	  Teasing	  apart	  a	  perceptual	   from	  a	  
cognitive	  bias	  in	  this	  way	  would	  provide	  a	  rich	  understanding	  of	  how	  processing	  of	  a	  stimulus	  can	  be	  
biased	  at	  the	  most	  basic	  levels	  of	  visual	  processing	  and	  how	  this	  may	  interact	  with	  response	  criteria	  
and	  other	  such	  decision	  processes	  at	  a	  more	  cognitive	  level.	  
	  
What	  does	  the	  Bayesian	  Approach	  to	  Person	  Perception	  Offer?	  
By	   establishing	   the	   role	   of	   prior	   knowledge	   in	   person	   perception,	   we	   hope	   to	   achieve	   a	   better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  expectation	  shapes	  our	  processing	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  In	  addition	  
to	  biases	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  gaze	  and	  sex	  perception,	  there	  are	  established	  biases	  in	  age	  estimation	  
and	   attractiveness	   judgments.	   Experiments	   within	   a	   Bayesian	   framework	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  
contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  each	  of	  these	  important	  aspects	  of	  person	  perception	  by	  making	  
such	  biases	  explicable	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  not	  been	  possible	  before.	  
It	  has	  recently	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  deficits	   in	  person	  perception	  associated	  with	  autism	  might	  
be	   understood	   in	   a	   Bayesian	   framework	   in	   terms	   of	   weak	   or	   inefficient	   priors	   (Pellicano	   &	   Burr,	  
2012).	   This	   may	   similarly	   apply	   to	   people	   with	   schizophrenia	   who	   also	   show	   changed	   person	  
perception	  abilities	  (Watson,	  2013).	  Thus,	  we	  anticipate	  that	  experiments	  conducted	  on	  samples	  of	  
the	  normal	  population	  will	  likely	  seed	  further	  research	  with	  clinical	  populations	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  
We	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  Bayesian	  approach	  to	  perception	  tends	  to	  polarise	  researchers	  in	  the	  field	  
and	  that	  there	  are	  situations	  where	  it	  can	  struggle	  to	  provide	  a	  parsimonious	  account	  of	  behavioural	  
data	   (e.g.	   Anderson	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   However,	   the	   application	   of	   a	   Bayesian	   framework	   to	   person	  
perception	  is	  a	  novel	  step	  that	  we	  believe	  will	  advance	  the	  field	  for	  the	  following	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  it	  
provides	  an	  explicit	  computational	  approach	  generating	  empirically	  testable	  predictions.	  Secondly,	  it	  
motivates	  a	  new	  class	  of	  experiments	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  uncertainty	  whose	  results	  will	  serve	  
to	  constrain	  models	  (Bayesian	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  person	  perception.	  Thirdly,	  it	  will	  provoke	  discussion	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of	  the	  kinds	  of	  model	  that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  the	  perception	  of	  socially	  relevant	  stimuli	  and	  other	  
aspects	  of	  social	  behaviour	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  evidence	  is	  required	  to	  choose	  between	  them.	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Figure	  1.	   The	  dissonance	  we	  experience	  while	   looking	  at	   this	   image	   indicates	   that	  we	  have	  strong	  
expectations	   about	   the	   basic	   structural	   properties	   of	   a	   face	   that	   cannot	   help	   but	   influence	   our	  
perception	  (see	  Hancock	  &	  Foster,	  2012).	  
Figure	  2:	  For	  Gaussian	   likelihood	   function	  (L(θN	  |	  θ);	  dashed	  blue	   line)	  and	  prior	  distribution	   (p(θ);	  
dotted	   red	   line)	   (A)	   the	   posterior	   (p(θ	   |	   θN);	   solid	   black	   line)	   is	   also	   Gaussian	   with	   a	   mean	  
corresponding	   to	   the	  maximum	   a	   posteriori	   estimate	   of	   the	   attribute	   value	   on	   that	   trial	   (B).	   The	  
maximum	  a	  posteriori	  estimate,	  θMAP,	  is	  pulled	  away	  from	  the	  raw	  sensory	  estimate,	  θN,	  towards	  the	  
peak	   of	   the	   prior,	   θprior,	   by	   an	   amount	   dependent	   on	   the	   level	   of	   uncertainty,	   σ0,	   in	   the	   sensory	  
estimate.	  
Figure	   3:	   (A)	   Example	   stimuli	   as	   used	   in	  Mareschal	   et	   al.	   	   (2013ab,	   2014).	   Both	   faces	   have	   eyes	  
deviated	  9	  degrees	  rightwards	  but	  the	  eyes	  in	  the	  right	  hand	  face	  have	  noisy	  texture	  added	  and	  are	  
reduced	   in	   contrast.	   (B)	   Judgments	   of	   gaze	   deviation	   using	   a	   forced-­‐choice	   task	   show	   a	   bias	   to	  
perceive	   the	  noisy	  stimulus	  as	   looking	  more	  direct	   (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2013b).	  Bias	   in	   the	  perceived	  
direction	   of	   gaze	   of	   a	   test	   face	   is	   plotted	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	   direction	   of	   a	   comparator.	   In	   this	  
experiment	  either	  the	  test	  or	  the	  comparator	  face	  had	  noise	  added	  to	  the	  eyes	  (red	  circles	  and	  blue	  
squares,	  respectively).	  A	  signature	  of	  a	  prior	  for	  direct	  gaze	  is	  that	  the	  slopes	  of	  the	  best	  fitting	  lines	  
to	  these	  data	  are	  oppositely	  signed	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  increased	  uncertainty	  is	  in	  the	  test	  or	  
the	  comparator.	  Here,	  perceived	  gaze	  deviation	  is	  “pulled”	  towards	  a	  direction	  close	  to	  (but	  for	  this	  
subject	   slightly	   rightwards	   of)	   zero,	   indicated	   by	   the	   horizontal	   gaze	   deviation	   at	   which	   the	   lines	  
cross	  each	  other	  and	  the	  x-­‐axis.	  The	  approximately	  linear	  increase	  in	  bias	  magnitude	  with	  horizontal	  
gaze	  deviation	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  prior	  probability	  distribution	  being	  a	  roughly	  Gaussian	  function	  
of	  gaze	  direction	  (C)	  Results	  using	  a	  pointer	  to	  indicate	  perceived	  direction	  of	  gaze	  indicate	  that	  the	  
“pull”	   towards	  direct	   gaze	   is	  not	   restricted	   to	  horizontal	   gaze	  deviations	  but	   generalizes	   across	   all	  
directions	  (Mareschal	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Here,	  lines	  join	  data	  points	  from	  corresponding	  stimuli	  presented	  
in	  noiseless	  (solid	  symbol)	  and	  noisy	  conditions.	  The	  resulting	  needles	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  point	  towards	  
a	  direction	  close	  to	  direct	  gaze.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  perceptual	  bias	  is	  towards	  direct	  gaze	  per	  
se	  rather	  than	  towards	  the	  orientation	  of	   the	  head,	  as	  head	  orientation	   is	  15	  degrees	   leftwards	  of	  
direct,	  indicated	  by	  the	  position	  of	  the	  H.	  
Figure	   4:	   Schematic	   illustration	  of	   how	   the	   effects	   of	   perceptual	   adaptation	   and	   a	   prior	   for	   direct	  
gaze	  might	  both	  be	  instantiated	  within	  the	  same	  channel	  structure.	  (A)	  A	  stimulus	  with	  eyes	  clearly	  
visible	   (high	  certainty)	  gazing	  slightly	   to	   the	  right	  excites	  channels	  preferring	  direct	  and	  rightwards	  
gaze	  and	  leads	  to	  an	  essentially	  veridical	  percept	  of	  gaze	  direction	  (height	  of	  bars	  indicates	  level	  of	  
response	  of	  each	  channel).	  (B)	  Adaptation	  to	  rightwards	  averted	  gaze	  reduces	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  
rightwards	   channel	   from	   its	   unadapted	   level	   (dashed	   line),	   causing	   subsequently	   presented	  
rightwards	  gaze	  to	  appear	  as	  more	  direct	  (perceptual	  shift	  indicated	  by	  arrow).	  (C)	  The	  response	  to	  a	  
stimulus	   with	   poorly	   visible	   eyes	   (low	   certainty)	   leads	   to	   a	   reduced	   response	   in	   the	   direct	   and	  
rightwards	  channels	  such	  that	  the	  baseline	  response	  of	  the	  leftwards	  channel	  is	  no	  longer	  negligible	  
in	   comparison,	   causing	   the	   perceived	   direction	   of	   gaze	   to	   be	   pulled	   towards	   direct.	   The	   prior	   for	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